kernel-aes67/security
Stephen Smalley ea6b184f7d selinux: use default proc sid on symlinks
As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of
symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks.
This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree
as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example.
This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories.
ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-09-30 00:26:53 +10:00
..
keys keys: remove unused key_alloc_sem 2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
selinux selinux: use default proc sid on symlinks 2008-09-30 00:26:53 +10:00
smack Merge branch 'master' into next 2008-08-28 10:47:34 +10:00
capability.c security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() 2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
commoncap.c file capabilities: uninline cap_safe_nice 2008-09-27 15:07:56 +10:00
device_cgroup.c devcgroup: fix race against rmdir() 2008-09-02 19:21:38 -07:00
inode.c security: add/fix security kernel-doc 2008-08-20 20:16:32 +10:00
Kconfig securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY 2008-08-28 10:47:42 +10:00
Makefile securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY 2008-08-28 10:47:42 +10:00
root_plug.c security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() 2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
security.c Merge branch 'master' into next 2008-08-28 10:47:34 +10:00