bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.
Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.
The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.
The implementation is as follows:
REG_AX = SRC_REG
if(offset)
REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
DST_REG = 0;
else
DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.
The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.
Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:
SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
{
*(volatile long *)sk;
return 0;
}
BPF Program before | BPF Program after
------------------ | -----------------
0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1
----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32
2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
\ 5: (05) goto pc+1
\ 6: (b7) r1 = 0
\--------------------------------------
7: (b7) r0 = 0
8: (95) exit
As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.
Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.
x86-64 JIT
==========
JIT's Instrumentation
(upstream)
---------------------
0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
5: xchg %ax,%ax
7: push %rbp
8: mov %rsp,%rbp
b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
19: cmp %r11,%rdi
1c: jb 0x000000000000002a
1e: mov %rdi,%r11
21: add $0x0,%r11
28: jae 0x000000000000002e
2a: xor %edi,%edi
2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032
2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
---------------------------------
32: xor %eax,%eax
34: leave
35: ret
The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.
ARM64 JIT
=========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0
4: nop 4: nop
8: paciasp 8: paciasp
c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp
14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp
28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0
2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0
30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0
34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32
3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12
40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050
44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0]
48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054
4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0
50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \---------------------------------------
54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0
58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp
5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16
60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16
64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16
68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16
6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
70: add x0, x7, #0x0
74: autiasp
78: ret
7c: nop
80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088
84: br x10
There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).
RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
==========
No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation
(upstream) (This patch)
----------------- --------------------------
0: nop 0: nop
4: nop 4: nop
8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33
c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16
10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp)
14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16
18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0
--------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32
20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096
24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1
28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12
2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0)
30: ret \ 34: j 8
\ 38: li a0, 0
\------------------------------
3c: li a5, 0
40: ld s0, 8(sp)
44: addi sp, sp, 16
48: sext.w a0, a5
4c: ret
There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.
Fixes: 8008342853 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Puranjay Mohan
Alexei Starovoitov
parent
5bcf0dcbf9
commit
66e13b615a
|
|
@ -3473,3 +3473,9 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* x86-64 JIT emits its own code to filter user addresses so return 0 here */
|
||||
u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -963,6 +963,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call(void);
|
|||
bool bpf_jit_supports_exceptions(void);
|
||||
bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void);
|
||||
bool bpf_jit_supports_arena(void);
|
||||
u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void);
|
||||
void arch_bpf_stack_walk(bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp), void *cookie);
|
||||
bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2942,6 +2942,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_arena(void)
|
|||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE)
|
||||
return TASK_SIZE;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Return TRUE if the JIT backend satisfies the following two conditions:
|
||||
* 1) JIT backend supports atomic_xchg() on pointer-sized words.
|
||||
* 2) Under the specific arch, the implementation of xchg() is the same
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19675,6 +19675,36 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
|
|||
goto next_insn;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */
|
||||
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
|
||||
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
|
||||
BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) {
|
||||
struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
|
||||
u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!uaddress_limit)
|
||||
goto next_insn;
|
||||
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
|
||||
if (insn->off)
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off);
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2);
|
||||
*patch++ = *insn;
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
|
||||
*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
cnt = patch - insn_buf;
|
||||
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
|
||||
if (!new_prog)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
|
||||
delta += cnt - 1;
|
||||
env->prog = prog = new_prog;
|
||||
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
|
||||
goto next_insn;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
|
||||
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
|
||||
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue