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abda472017
freeswitch/libs/srtp/crypto/cipher/aes_icm.c
Michael Jerris abda472017 srtp msvc updates and cleanup 
git-svn-id: http://svn.freeswitch.org/svn/freeswitch/trunk@1087 d0543943-73ff-0310-b7d9-9358b9ac24b2
2006-04-07 16:34:02 +00:00

510 lines
15 KiB
C
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/*
* aes_icm.c
*
* AES Integer Counter Mode
*
* David A. McGrew
* Cisco Systems, Inc.
*/
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2005, Cisco Systems, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
* disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided
* with the distribution.
*
* Neither the name of the Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
* INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
* (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#define ALIGN_32 0
#include "aes_icm.h"
#include "alloc.h"
debug_module_t mod_aes_icm = {
0, /* debugging is off by default */
"aes icm" /* printable module name */
};
/*
* integer counter mode works as follows:
*
* 16 bits
* <----->
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
* | nonce | pakcet index | ctr |---+
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ |
* |
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ v
* | salt |000000|->(+)
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ |
* |
* +---------+
* | encrypt |
* +---------+
* |
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ |
* | keystream block |<--+
* +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
*
* All fields are big-endian
*
* ctr is the block counter, which increments from zero for
* each packet (16 bits wide)
*
* packet index is distinct for each packet (48 bits wide)
*
* nonce can be distinct across many uses of the same key, or
* can be a fixed value per key, or can be per-packet randomness
* (64 bits)
*
*/
err_status_t
aes_icm_alloc_ismacryp(cipher_t **c, int key_len, int forIsmacryp) {
extern cipher_type_t aes_icm;
uint8_t *pointer;
int tmp;
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"allocating cipher with key length %d", key_len);
// Ismacryp, for example, uses 16 byte key + 8 byte
// salt so this function is called with key_len = 24.
// The check for key_len = 30 does not apply. Our usage
// of aes functions with key_len = values other than 30
// has not broken anything. Don't know what would be the
// effect of skipping this check for srtp in general.
if (!forIsmacryp && key_len != 30)
return err_status_bad_param;
/* allocate memory a cipher of type aes_icm */
tmp = (sizeof(aes_icm_ctx_t) + sizeof(cipher_t));
pointer = crypto_alloc(tmp);
if (pointer == NULL)
return err_status_alloc_fail;
/* set pointers */
*c = (cipher_t *)pointer;
(*c)->type = &aes_icm;
(*c)->state = pointer + sizeof(cipher_t);
/* increment ref_count */
aes_icm.ref_count++;
/* set key size */
(*c)->key_len = key_len;
return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t aes_icm_alloc(cipher_t **c, int key_len, int forIsmacryp) {
return aes_icm_alloc_ismacryp(c, key_len, 0);
}
err_status_t
aes_icm_dealloc(cipher_t *c) {
extern cipher_type_t aes_icm;
/* zeroize entire state*/
octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t *)c,
sizeof(aes_icm_ctx_t) + sizeof(cipher_t));
/* free memory */
crypto_free(c);
/* decrement ref_count */
aes_icm.ref_count--;
return err_status_ok;
}
/*
* aes_icm_context_init(...) initializes the aes_icm_context
* using the value in key[].
*
* the key is the secret key
*
* the salt is unpredictable (but not necessarily secret) data which
* randomizes the starting point in the keystream
*/
err_status_t
aes_icm_context_init(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key) {
v128_t tmp_key;
/* set counter and initial values to 'offset' value */
/* FIX!!! this assumes the salt is at key + 16, and thus that the */
/* FIX!!! cipher key length is 16! Also note this copies past the
end of the 'key' array by 2 bytes! */
v128_copy_octet_string(&c->counter, key + 16);
v128_copy_octet_string(&c->offset, key + 16);
/* force last two octets of the offset to zero (for srtp compatibility) */
c->offset.v8[14] = c->offset.v8[15] = 0;
c->counter.v8[14] = c->counter.v8[15] = 0;
/* set tmp_key (for alignment) */
v128_copy_octet_string(&tmp_key, key);
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"key: %s", v128_hex_string(&tmp_key));
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
/* expand key */
aes_expand_encryption_key(&tmp_key, c->expanded_key);
/* indicate that the keystream_buffer is empty */
c->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
return err_status_ok;
}
/*
* aes_icm_set_octet(c, i) sets the counter of the context which it is
* passed so that the next octet of keystream that will be generated
* is the ith octet
*/
err_status_t
aes_icm_set_octet(aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
uint64_t octet_num) {
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
int tail_num = low32(octet_num) & 0x0f;
/* 64-bit right-shift 4 */
uint64_t block_num = make64(high32(octet_num) >> 4,
((high32(octet_num) & 0x0f)<<(32-4)) |
(low32(octet_num) >> 4));
#else
int tail_num = (int)(octet_num % 16);
uint64_t block_num = octet_num / 16;
#endif
/* set counter value */
/* FIX - There's no way this is correct */
c->counter.v64[0] = c->offset.v64[0];
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
c->counter.v64[0] = make64(high32(c->offset.v64[0]) ^ high32(block_num),
low32(c->offset.v64[0]) ^ low32(block_num));
#else
c->counter.v64[0] = c->offset.v64[0] ^ block_num;
#endif
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"set_octet: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
/* fill keystream buffer, if needed */
if (tail_num) {
v128_copy(&c->keystream_buffer, &c->counter);
aes_encrypt(&c->keystream_buffer, c->expanded_key);
c->bytes_in_buffer = sizeof(v128_t);
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "counter: %s",
v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "ciphertext: %s",
v128_hex_string(&c->keystream_buffer));
/* indicate number of bytes in keystream_buffer */
c->bytes_in_buffer = sizeof(v128_t) - tail_num;
} else {
/* indicate that keystream_buffer is empty */
c->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
}
return err_status_ok;
}
/*
* aes_icm_set_iv(c, iv) sets the counter value to the exor of iv with
* the offset
*/
err_status_t
aes_icm_set_iv(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv) {
v128_t *nonce = iv;
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(nonce));
v128_xor(&c->counter, &c->offset, nonce);
debug_print(mod_aes_icm,
"set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
/* indicate that the keystream_buffer is empty */
c->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
return err_status_ok;
}
/*
* aes_icm_advance(...) refills the keystream_buffer and
* advances the block index of the sicm_context forward by one
*
* this is an internal, hopefully inlined function
*/
inline void
aes_icm_advance_ismacryp(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, uint8_t forIsmacryp) {
/* fill buffer with new keystream */
v128_copy(&c->keystream_buffer, &c->counter);
aes_encrypt(&c->keystream_buffer, c->expanded_key);
c->bytes_in_buffer = sizeof(v128_t);
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "counter: %s",
v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "ciphertext: %s",
v128_hex_string(&c->keystream_buffer));
/* clock counter forward */
if (forIsmacryp) {
uint32_t temp;
//alex's clock counter forward
temp = ntohl(c->counter.v32[3]);
c->counter.v32[3] = htonl(++temp);
} else {
if (!++(c->counter.v8[15]))
++(c->counter.v8[14]);
}
}
inline void aes_icm_advance(aes_icm_ctx_t *c) {
aes_icm_advance_ismacryp(c, 0);
}
/*e
* icm_encrypt deals with the following cases:
*
* bytes_to_encr < bytes_in_buffer
* - add keystream into data
*
* bytes_to_encr > bytes_in_buffer
* - add keystream into data until keystream_buffer is depleted
* - loop over blocks, filling keystream_buffer and then
* adding keystream into data
* - fill buffer then add in remaining (< 16) bytes of keystream
*/
err_status_t
aes_icm_encrypt_ismacryp(aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *enc_len,
int forIsmacryp) {
unsigned int bytes_to_encr = *enc_len;
unsigned int i;
uint32_t *b;
/* check that there's enough segment left but not for ismacryp*/
if (!forIsmacryp && (bytes_to_encr + htons(c->counter.v16[7])) > 0xffff)
return err_status_terminus;
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "block index: %d",
htons(c->counter.v16[7]));
if (bytes_to_encr <= c->bytes_in_buffer) {
/* deal with odd case of small bytes_to_encr */
for (i = (sizeof(v128_t) - c->bytes_in_buffer);
i < (sizeof(v128_t) - c->bytes_in_buffer + bytes_to_encr); i++)
{
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[i];
}
c->bytes_in_buffer -= bytes_to_encr;
/* return now to avoid the main loop */
return err_status_ok;
} else {
/* encrypt bytes until the remaining data is 16-byte aligned */
for (i=(sizeof(v128_t) - c->bytes_in_buffer); i < sizeof(v128_t); i++)
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[i];
bytes_to_encr -= c->bytes_in_buffer;
c->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
}
/* now loop over entire 16-byte blocks of keystream */
for (i=0; i < (bytes_to_encr/sizeof(v128_t)); i++) {
/* fill buffer with new keystream */
aes_icm_advance_ismacryp(c, forIsmacryp);
/*
* add keystream into the data buffer (this would be a lot faster
* if we could assume 32-bit alignment!)
*/
#if ALIGN_32
b = (uint32_t *)buf;
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[0];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[1];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[2];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[3];
buf = (uint8_t *)b;
#else
if ((((unsigned long) buf) & 0x03) != 0) {
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[0];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[1];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[2];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[3];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[4];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[5];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[6];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[7];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[8];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[9];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[10];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[11];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[12];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[13];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[14];
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[15];
} else {
b = (uint32_t *)buf;
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[0];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[1];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[2];
*b++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v32[3];
buf = (uint8_t *)b;
}
#endif /* #if ALIGN_32 */
}
/* if there is a tail end of the data, process it */
if ((bytes_to_encr & 0xf) != 0) {
/* fill buffer with new keystream */
aes_icm_advance_ismacryp(c, forIsmacryp);
for (i=0; i < (bytes_to_encr & 0xf); i++)
*buf++ ^= c->keystream_buffer.v8[i];
/* reset the keystream buffer size to right value */
c->bytes_in_buffer = sizeof(v128_t) - i;
} else {
/* no tail, so just reset the keystream buffer size to zero */
c->bytes_in_buffer = 0;
}
return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
aes_icm_encrypt(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *enc_len) {
return aes_icm_encrypt_ismacryp(c, buf, enc_len, 0);
}
err_status_t
aes_icm_output(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, uint8_t *buffer, int num_octets_to_output) {
unsigned int len = num_octets_to_output;
/* zeroize the buffer */
octet_string_set_to_zero(buffer, num_octets_to_output);
/* exor keystream into buffer */
return aes_icm_encrypt(c, buffer, &len);
}
char
aes_icm_description[] = "aes integer counter mode";
uint8_t aes_icm_test_case_0_key[30] = {
0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd
};
uint8_t aes_icm_test_case_0_nonce[16] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
uint8_t aes_icm_test_case_0_plaintext[32] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
};
uint8_t aes_icm_test_case_0_ciphertext[32] = {
0xe0, 0x3e, 0xad, 0x09, 0x35, 0xc9, 0x5e, 0x80,
0xe1, 0x66, 0xb1, 0x6d, 0xd9, 0x2b, 0x4e, 0xb4,
0xd2, 0x35, 0x13, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x02, 0xd0, 0xf7,
0x2a, 0x43, 0xa2, 0xfe, 0x4a, 0x5f, 0x97, 0xab
};
cipher_test_case_t aes_icm_test_case_0 = {
30, /* octets in key */
aes_icm_test_case_0_key, /* key */
aes_icm_test_case_0_nonce, /* packet index */
32, /* octets in plaintext */
aes_icm_test_case_0_plaintext, /* plaintext */
32, /* octets in ciphertext */
aes_icm_test_case_0_ciphertext, /* ciphertext */
NULL /* pointer to next testcase */
};
/*
* note: the encrypt function is identical to the decrypt function
*/
cipher_type_t aes_icm = {
(cipher_alloc_func_t) aes_icm_alloc,
(cipher_dealloc_func_t) aes_icm_dealloc,
(cipher_init_func_t) aes_icm_context_init,
(cipher_encrypt_func_t) aes_icm_encrypt,
(cipher_decrypt_func_t) aes_icm_encrypt,
(cipher_set_iv_func_t) aes_icm_set_iv,
(char *) aes_icm_description,
(int) 0, /* instance count */
(cipher_test_case_t *) &aes_icm_test_case_0,
(debug_module_t *) &mod_aes_icm
};
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